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Does the water have feelings?

Written by Daniel Shasha

The era of Egyptian domination had reached its limit. After generations of cruelty and oppression, the time arrived for divine justice to be enacted. Hashem decreed that Egypt would be struck with ten plagues, each one dismantling another foundation of its arrogance and power. Yet it is striking that Moshe, the central figure of the Exodus, did not perform the first three plagues. Instead, they were carried out by his brother Aharon.

This choice calls for explanation. Moshe was the leader of the redemption from Egypt, the agent through whom the process of freedom unfolded. Why, then, was he not the one to initiate these early plagues?

The first two plagues—blood and frogs—required striking the Nile River. For Moshe, the Nile was not merely a symbol of Egyptian power; it was deeply connected to his own survival. When Pharaoh decreed the death of all Jewish infant boys, Moshe was saved through an extraordinary chain of events. Placed in a basket and set upon the Nile, he was discovered by Pharaoh’s daughter, who had compassion on him and raised him in the royal palace. In a very real sense, the river was the instrument through which his life was preserved.

Out of gratitude for that role, Moshe could not bring himself to strike the Nile. To do so—even in fulfillment of a divine command—would have conflicted with the profound sense of hakaras hatov that defined his character.

The same principle applied to the third plague, lice, which involved striking the earth. Years earlier, Moshe had killed an Egyptian taskmaster who was brutally abusing a fellow Jew and buried the body in the ground. Although the incident was eventually discovered and Moshe was forced to flee Egypt, the earth had nevertheless provided him with a brief moment of concealment. For that limited protection alone, Moshe felt obligated to show gratitude. Therefore, Aharon performed the plague in his stead (Midrash Tanchuma).

At first glance, this comparison appears uneven. The Nile clearly saved Moshe’s life, whereas the earth’s assistance was fleeting and ultimately ineffective. Why, then, did Moshe consider himself indebted to the earth at all?

Rav Matisyahu Solomon explains that gratitude is not measured by duration or outcome, but by benefit itself. Even a fleeting sense of security carries moral significance. The earth gave Moshe the belief—however brief—that his act had gone unnoticed. That moment alone was sufficient to obligate gratitude (Matnas Chaim).

A deeper question follows. Water and earth are inanimate; they possess no awareness and no capacity for offense. Why, then, would striking them constitute a failure of gratitude?

Rav Eliyahu Dessler addresses this point directly. Moshe’s restraint was not motivated by concern for the “feelings” of the river or the ground, but by concern for his own inner world. Gratitude, Rav Dessler explains, is not primarily about the recipient of kindness, but about the moral formation of the one who receives it. To strike something from which one has benefited—even for a higher purpose—risks dulling one’s sensitivity to kindness. Moshe therefore refrained, not out of sentimentality, but out of a disciplined commitment to preserving the integrity of his character (Michtav Me’Eliyahu).

This teaching has far-reaching practical implications. Human life is sustained continually by inanimate objects—food, clothing, tools, furniture, and infrastructure. While these things lack consciousness, our manner of relating to them shapes us. Treating the sources of our benefit with respect cultivates a habitual posture of gratitude. Over time, this posture extends naturally toward other people and, ultimately, toward Hashem.

This concept is not merely ethical but is reflected in halachic sources as well. Chazal teach that one who sees food lying in a degrading manner should not ignore it, but ensure it is treated properly (Eruvin 64b). They also teach that it is forbidden to throw a stone into a well from which one has drunk (Bava Kamma 92b).

The Alter of Slabodka emphasized that these teachings establish an obligation of gratitude even toward inanimate objects. The Ri Migash relates a remarkable incident involving the Rif, the great halachic authority of the eleventh century. The Rif declined to judge a case involving a bathhouse from which he personally benefited, explaining that he did not wish to issue a ruling that could be detrimental to something that had served him. The Ri Migash concludes that if such care is required toward inanimate objects, how much more so are we obligated to show gratitude to people—and all the more so to Hashem—for the good we receive (Responsa Ri Migash, 202).

This sensitivity was embodied by many of the great Torah leaders. Rabbi Yisrael Zev Gustman, the late Rosh Yeshivah of Netzach Yisrael, insisted on personally watering the plants and trees outside his yeshivah and never allowed his students to assist him.

He explained that in his youth, his teacher, Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, taught him how to distinguish between edible and poisonous plants in the forest. At the time, the lesson seemed theoretical. Years later, while fleeing the Nazis and hiding in the forests with no access to food, that knowledge enabled him to survive. Out of gratitude to the plants that sustained him during those years of terror, he undertook to care for plants personally for the rest of his life.

This disciplined approach to gratitude reveals its true purpose. It is not merely an expression of refinement, but a means of shaping character. By recognizing even the smallest sources of benefit, a person develops the capacity to appreciate the constant kindness with which Hashem sustains the world.

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